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The paper examines the metaphysical and ethical approaches underlying the ima-
ge of the self and the other in Advaita Vedānta (hereafter AV). AV examines the 
nature of the conceptual division between the self and the other, referred to by the 
terms ‘I’ (asmad) and ‘you’ (yuṣmad) respectively. Behind the mundane expre-
ssions of these terms AV identifies superimposition — adhyāsa as a metaphysical 
precursor, which generates a cognitive error in all such expressions where we use 
personal pronouns ‘I’ and attributes such as ‘fat’, ‘tall’ etc. thereupon. The positi-
on of AV is that the distinction between the self and the other is due to a cognitive 
error caused by superimposition. In other words, to see differences in reality is 
ignorance (avidyā). Moreover, if this ignorance is replaced by true knowledge, i.e., 
knowledge of reality as Advaita, i.e., Non–duality, we shall see the development 
of a different kind of understanding revealing the underlying unity of self and 
other. This knowledge of the underlying unity generates a different attitude which 
dissolves social problems such as socio–political inequality, hatred and violence, 
etc. grounded in the ‘self’–‘other’ distinction. Like any piece of knowledge, the 
knowledge of the realization of an underlying non–duality or advaita brings about 
an attitude change towards reality. In this case, the attitude of taking granted the 
distinction between ‘I’ and ‘you’ is changed to seeing non–duality in all indivi-
duals. 
However, in principle, since AV advocates non–duality, it cannot meaningfully 
talk about morality or ethics, since ethics presupposes duality between ‘I’ and 
‘you.’ So the challenge is to show that, according to AV, the non–duality of self 
and other is the source of morality. In addition, an ethics of active love is propo-
sed which is congruent with AV’s metaphysical commitments. The ethics of active 
love develops when one gives up the idea of differences and identifies oneself with 
others. It is a well known fact that the root of most social evils is the discrimina-
tion between ‘I’ and ‘You’. Moreover, it is the ego (I) that creates a rift between 
one man and another, and as a result, society suffers from various problems such 
as violence, hatred, social discrimination and corruption, etc. The conception of 
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the oneness of all beings advocated by AV creates a spirit of love and harmony 
among individual selves, and this love is the foundation stone of ethics or mora-
lity. Taking recourse to the AV’s exposition of the issue, a moral interpretation of 
the underlying unity of self and other is also intended. 
The aim of the paper is twofold: 1. To examine and present the metaphysical po-
sition of AV vis–à–vis the distinction between self and other. 2. To respond to the 
problem of the possibility of moral or ethical actions within AV metaphysics with 
a new kind of morality that is based on the identification of one’s self with others. 
In other words, an ethics based on and compatible with Advaita metaphysics.
Key words: Advaita, superimposition, enworlded subjectivity, Self, individual 
self, identity, differences, morality.
Introduction
AV is one of the prominent schools among the Indian philosophical systems. 
Śaṅkara, its main proponent, begins his philosophical analysis in his commen-
tary on Brahma Sūtra (Thibaut, 1890, pp. 108–111) by examining the nature of 
the conceptual division between self and other, which are referred to by the the 
terms ‘I’1 (asmad) and ‘You’ (yuṣmad) respectively. Here, “I” refers to the su-
bject of consciousness and ‘you’ refers to the object of consciousness. The subject 
of consciousness can never become an object of consciousness. Moreover, accor-
ding to AV, the subject of consciousness is of the nature of pure un–individua-
ted, non–dual, absolute consciousness, which is termed Brahman (ultimate rea-
lity). The distinction between self and other is the product of superimposition2 
(adhyāsa) which results from attributing properties of the object of consciousness 
to the subject of consciousness or Self. This superimposition (adhyāsa) generates 
a cognitive error, due to which we use “I” as the term for the subject and ascribe 
the attributes of mind, senses and body as in statements such as ‘“I” am fat’, ‘“I” 
1 In this paper ‘I’ is used in two senses. The first sense of ‘I’ is the individual referring to himself 
as an agent, enjoyer etc. This ‘I’ will be used with single inverted commas. The second sense of 
the “I” is the person referring to his/her inner soul or ātman; and it will be used in the paper 
with double inverted commas. In this context ‘I’ refers to the individual self. The terms ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ are used to refer to the empirical ‘I’ (self) and ‘you’ (other) on the basis of which all 
human interactions, behavior and morality etc. are explained. “I” in the transcendental sense is 
referred as Self or Brahman in order to convey the metaphysical non–duality of Self and Brah-
man. The overlap between them is always used in the transcendental sense; and the distinction in 
the empirical sense.
2 Superimposition is defined as attributing the property of one thing upon another (Thibaut, 1890, 
p. 108). All the Advaita Vedāntins agree about the perception of superimposition as proposed 
by the Śaṅkara. Śaṅkarācārya in Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya writes: »Some indeed define the term ‘su-
perimposition’ as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing upon another thing. Others, 
again, define superimposition as the error founded upon the non–apprehension of the difference 
between that which is superimposed and that onto which it is superimposed. Others again, define 
it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of the thing onto which somet-
hing else is superimposed. Still, all these definitions concur in so far as they define superimposi-
tion as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing« (Thibaut, 1890, 
p. 108).
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am tall’ etc. One uses the first person pronoun ‘I’ for oneself and the second per-
son pronoun ‘you’ for others who are never recognized as being connected with 
“I”, neither epistemologically, nor metaphysically. This unexamined distinction 
is caused by a fundamental ignorance (avidyā), which further causes numerous 
unaware behavioral patterns such as ‘“I” am fat’, ‘“I” am tall’ etc. This fundamen-
tal ignorance is regarded as beginning–less and natural (Thibaut, 1890, p. 111).
Ignorance gives rise to superimposition, i.e., the Self is attributed to the object 
and an object is being confused with the Self or subject (Thibaut, 1890, p. 108). 
Again, Self (ultimate reality)3 when confused with something other than itself, 
i.e., objects such as mind, senses and body, give rise to expressions like ‘“I” am 
this (the body)’, ‘this is mine,’ ‘“I” am fat’, ‘“I” am thin’ etc. The Self is therefore 
mistakenly identified with mind, senses and the body (objects). Actually, the Self 
is different from the Objects (BSBh, p. 1)4 in as much as the light is different from 
the darkness. In the first passage of the Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara states:
yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayor viṣayaviṣayiṇos tamaḥprakāśavad 
viruddhasvabhāvayor itaretarabhāvānupapattau siddhāyāṃ taddharmāṇām api 
sutarām itaretarabhāvānupapattir ity ataḥ (BSBh, p. 1).
The ‘subject’5 and ‘object’ are absolutely dissimilar and by nature are mutu-
ally opposed to each other and thus cannot be mutually superimposed. It is na-
tural on the part of human beings to superimpose the ‘object’ upon the ‘subject’ 
which are totally different from one other and incapable of being identified, i.e., 
of one being taken as the other. Here Sankara makes two points clear, namely 
that: 1) there is a dissimilarity between Subject and Object; 2) reciprocal supe-
rimposition or rather superimposition is impossible.
The Self whose essential nature is pure consciousness, is without attribute, 
devoid of any type of activity and difference. However, when objects like mind, 
senses and body are attributed to the Self, then the Self becomes an individual 
3 Self refers to Brahman. Self is ātman and ātman is no other than Brahman, according to AV. 
AV formulates the criterion of the real as that which remains uncontradicted in all spans of 
time — trikālikādyabādhyatvam. The world and its objects can be sublated at any time, there-
fore, these cannot be regarded as real. However, the experience of the identity between ātman 
and Brahman, once realized, is never contradicted by any other experience. So, considering the 
criterion provided by AV, the Brahman (Self or ātman) is called the real (ultimate reality). Now, 
the Brahman/atman, limited by ignorance, appears as the individual self or jīvā with mind, sen-
ses and body. The individual self identifies itself with mind, senses and body and says ‘“I” am 
this’ (Body), but the ātman in the individual self is none other than Brahman, and Brahman is 
absolute, without qualities of any kind and devoid of activity, a mere witnessing consciousness. 
Therefore, it is only under ignorance that the Brahman/ātman becomes limited and the notion of 
individual self or ‘I’ emerges.
4 Objects like mind, senses and body are also regarded as the not–self by AV.
5 The subject is pure consciousness. Pure consciousness conditioned by ignorance is the individual 
consciousness. If it is merely a passive observer or indifferent to the perceived object, it is called 
the witness–consciousness (sākṣī–Caitanya), and if it is actively involved with the object, it is 
called engaged–consciousness, the subject (jīva–caitanya). Both are essentially pure consciousne-
ss. However, when they operate under the spell of ignorance, they become individual consciou-
sness.
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self6 — the agent (I), and enjoyer of all activities. The mind, senses and body are 
the product of ignorance and have no reality of their own. These are regarded as 
unreal/non–real, as opposed to the real (Apte, 1960, pp. 24–32). The real is that 
which remains uncontradicted over all spans of time (Dasgupta, 1922, p. 444). 
Now, the mind, senses and body perish at the time of death,7 so they cannot be 
regarded as real. Therefore, they are unreal, i.e., false (mithyā) and are mista-
kenly attributed to the Self. The absence of discrimination between subject and 
object, which are opposed to each other, gives rise to identification of the Self 
with the body in the form of expressions like ‘“I” am fat’.
Similarly, an identification with the mind gives rise to expressions like ‘“I” am 
happy, sad’, and so on. The identification of the Self with attributes other than 
the Self is erroneous (Robbiano, 2016, pp. 138–142) since the Self is beyond these 
qualities. The Self in AV is pure consciousness, Brahman, the ultimate reality,8 
one without the second (ekam advitiyam). Self being pure consciousness cannot 
be lean, fair, happy, sad, etc.9 because these are the states or conditions of the 
body. Self under ignorance is limited by attributes of the not–self which gives rise 
to the notion of the individual self or jīva. Self is one and indivisible. It will not be 
possible to prove that there is a plurality of consciousness.
However, there does exist a plurality of individuals. Individual selves are a 
composite of mind, senses and body. Two individuals differ, not on account of 
the consciousness in them, but on account of the mind and body. Mind, senses 
and the body are the products of ignorance and have no reality of their own. They 
are regarded as unreal as opposed to the real: 
For the real is known to us as that which is proved by the pramānas, and which will 
never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. A thing is said to 
be true only so long as it is not contradicted; but since at the dawn of right knowledge 
6 Self in AV is the witness consciousness. Pure consciousness, on account of its association with 
ignorance becomes the witness of the perceived objects. This witness consciousness, when limited 
by mind–senses and body, becomes the individual self. In this paper, Self (with a capital ‘S’) is 
taken to mean Pure consciousness or Brahman. Self (with a small ‘S’) is the individual self; the 
agent and enjoyer of the fruits of action. The difference between Self and individual self is that 
Self is devoid of any type of activity, but individual self performs actions and is limited.
7 The body is reduced to ashes, but there is no destruction of Self, because Self has the nature of 
being always in existence, i.e., being eternal.
8 The examples given ‘“I” am fat’ ‘“I” am tall’ etc refer to ātman. In simple words attributes of the 
body (fat, tall) are ascribed to the Self/ātman under superimposition.
9 Self, pure consciousness and Brahman are identical in AV. Self does not become consciousness 
but rather Self is pure consciousness or Brahman. This consciousness is not a contingent quality 
that emerges and disappears in conjunction with the presence and absence of objects. Nor does 
this consciousness expand or contract with the appearance or disappearance of objects. It shines 
forth eternally in unabated form. Pure consciousness is the very basis of existence. It is in and 
pervades all. Without pure consciousness there would be nothing. Everything that is present is by 
its very nature pure consciousness, and if there was nothing present, pure consciousness would 
still be present. Pure consciousness is the ultimate reality and all else is a mere appearance of 
this consciousness/ātman/Brahman. The fundamental assertion of AV is “ātman is Brahman” 
(ātma ca Brahma) (Apte, 1960, pp. 5–9). Self is not a an aspect of Brahman but is the Brahman. 
‘Brahman’ and ‘Self’ are two different labels for one and the same ultimate reality.
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this world–appearance will be found to be false and non–existing, it cannot be regar-
ded as real (Dasgupta, 1922, p. 444).
Now, since the mind, senses, and body perish at the time of death, they cannot 
be regarded as real; therefore they are unreal, i.e., false (mithyā) and are mi-
stakenly attributed to the Self. One and the same consciousness appears to be 
plural as it is qualified by the plurality of adjuncts (upādhi).10 The individual self 
projects the notion of self and other while in reality there is no duality. In order 
to show the reality of the Self and unreality of the object, AV formulates the 
criterion of the real in another way. The real is that which can never be contra-
dicted and which is uniformly present in all our experience. Individual jīva has 
three states of experience — the wakefulness, dream and deep sleep states. In 
the wakeful state the individual self is conscious of and encounters the objects of 
the external world through the functioning of the mind and senses. In the dream 
state, the mind alone functions and projects objects of its own. The deep sleep 
state is bereft of the functioning of the mind and senses and, as a result, there 
remains no awareness of objects. It depicts that in the wakeful and the dream 
states, the mind and senses are sometimes present and sometimes absent, but 
Self remains uniformly present in all states of experience. It reveals that the Self 
alone is real while all attributes other than Self have no reality of their own (Ba-
lasubramanian, 1989, pp. 32–37).
Self, limited by “adjuncts”, becomes finite. The result of superimposing these 
adjuncts is that the individual thinks oneself to be limited in knowledge, power 
and in other aspects. The individual becomes subject to pain and pleasure and 
is caught up in the transmigratory existence. Ignorance is the foundation of all 
aspects of the cognitions. Worldly activities based on the sense of difference and 
duality between self and other (born out of ignorance) lead to serious consequ-
ences in society. The difference, when used to discriminate oneself or one’s gro-
up from all ‘others’, leads to some perplexing evil of the present time, such as 
communal violence, violence against women, corruption, etc. The focus of the 
paper is to reveal that in the context of AV, the difference has no ontological 
existence of its own. All existent beings have one ground i.e., pure consciousness 
or Self, and this concept, if apprehended properly, can lead to generating greater 
social harmony. The duality of self and other is based on error, and it can be dis-
pelled only by the knowledge of ultimate reality (Brahman).
1. Superimposition and some prevailing misconceptions
Śaṅkara introduces this notion of superimposition (adhyāsa) to support the 
perceived distinction between the subject and object of consciousness. According 
to him, we identify the subject of consciousness with the object of consciousness 
10 Upādhi is that which »seems to alter or limits the true nature of object« (BSBh, p. 58).
S. Raina, The ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’... Obnovljeni život, 2018, 73(4), 517–535
522
because we superimpose attributes of one upon the other, and vice versa.11 Supe-
rimposition (adhyāsa) is an apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing 
upon another.12 Śaṅkara further reiterates that »superimposition is cognizing 
something as something else«.13 According to AV, the true nature of reality is 
concealed due to superimposition. Moreover, what we see is a projection of re-
ality after superimposition. However, this concept of superimposition on which 
the AV thesis relies heavily, has become the target of criticism. One particular 
criticism of AV is that, it claims the empirical world is to be regarded as false. 
Brahman, which is pure, absolute and non–dual consciousness,14 is said to be 
the sole reality,15and the world is regarded as false (CVS, p. 64). This viewpoint 
has given rise to various objections. If the world is false, so the world has no exi-
stence just like a snake has no existence in the case of the rope–snake illusion. 
The world is merely our fancy or imagination (Singh, 1989, pp. 75–80). Another 
misunderstanding about AV is that, if all that exists is Brahman and the world 
is merely illusory or false, then there cannot be a real distinction between good 
and evil, right and wrong. The world is illusory, implies that the social and moral 
obligations are also merely the product of the illusion, then why should one walk 
on the path of truthfulness if truth and falsity are nothing but illusions? (Ranade, 
11 »The superimposition of the object which is the content of the concept “you” and its attributes, 
upon the subject which is the content of the concept ‘I’ and which is the nature of pure conscio-
usness« (Apte, 1960, pp. 2–4): asmatpratyayagocare viṣayiṇi cidātmake yuṣmatpratyayagocarasya 
viṣayasya taddharmāṇāṃ cādhyāsaḥ.
12 »What is superimposition? It is an awareness of what was seen in another locus and is a form 
of memory. Some say that it is the superimposition of the attributes of one thing upon another. 
Others say that superimposition upon another is an illusion because of non–discriminati-
on. Others still, say that superimposition on another is the imagination of opposite attributes 
present in themselves. In any case, there is no straying away from the awareness of one thing 
as being something else. Similar to this is worldly experience –a shell appears like silver and 
a single moon appears like two« (Apte, 1960, pp. 5–9): āha–ko ‘yam adhyāso nāmeti. ucyate–
smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ. taṃ kecid anyatrānyadharmādhyāsa iti vadanti. kecit 
tu yatra yadadhyāsas tadvivekāgrahanibandhano bhrama iti. anye tu yatra yadadhyāsas tasyaiva 
viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate iti.
13 adhyāso nāma atasmiṃs tadbuddhir ity avocāma (CVS, pp. 108–109).
14 According to AV anything that never changes and remains uncontradicted is ultimately real. It 
is Brahman only that is real, according to AV. Again, Self (ātman) is identical to Brahman. The 
ātman veiled by ignorance appears as the individual selves, just as indivisible space appears plural 
on account of its limitation. Space appears to be divided into pots, rooms, etc. The material of 
pots cannot divide space into parts. For the sake of particular reference we differentiate between 
pot–space, room–space, open— space, etc., but space as such is indivisible. Similarly, Self being 
one and indivisible appears as being many due to ignorance. The ego, mind, body, senses etc. 
are the products of ignorance. When the non–dual and part–less knowledge of Brahman/ātman 
is realized, ignorance and and all the products thereof are destroyed. Thus, one can realize the 
non–dual ultimate reality as one’s own Ātman itself, and that Ātman is the Brahman (Swami 
Madhvananda, 1921, p. 101).
15 janmotpattir ādir asyeti tadguṇasaṃvijñāno bahuvrīhiḥ (Apte, 1960, pp. 9–14). Translation: “Bra-
hman is that from which something proceeds, originates, etc. i.e. origin, subsistence, destructi-
on, control, enlightenment, nescience, bondage and liberation of this known animate and ina-
nimate world.”; sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma Translation: “Brahman, you see, is this whole world” 
(Śaṅkarācārya, 2015, 3.14.1).
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1970, p. 146). The falsity of the world thesis, thus, would destroy the very founda-
tion of morality. Everything in the world is brought into existence as a result of 
superimposition. Śaṅkara’s three main presuppositions that Brahman is the sole 
reality, the world is false and the individual self is none other than Brahman 
(CVS, p. 64), has led to two major misunderstandings about AV: 1) If the world 
is false, then the world is non–existent. This would render the world a fancy or 
the product of our imagination (Singh, 1989, p. 75–80). 2) If the world has an 
illusory existence, then ethics or morality16 are meaningless.
However, these prevailing views hinge on a misconception. It is not possible 
to regard the individual self which is conscious of itself as being illusory, in the 
same manner, the world of our experience, in which all actions and experiences 
occur, cannot be regarded as illusory. »Just as it is not possible for me to know 
that ‘I do not exist,’ so also it is not possible for me to know that I am illusory« 
(Sen, 1989, pp. 72–74). The world, according to AV, has Brahman as its substra-
tum (Swami Madhvananda, 1921, p. 104). It is not right to regard the world as 
mere fancy and a product of the imagination. Against the first misunderstanding, 
it is contended that the fancy or imagination implies that the object perceived 
is a projection of the mind. However, Śaṅkara never admits that the world is a 
projection of the mind (Apte, 1960, pp. 402–403). The mind may know the world 
but does not constitute it or determine its nature. The system of AV advocates 
empirical realism, i.e., the view that whatever is perceived exists independent of 
the perceiving mind (Apte, 1960, pp. 397–398). The object perceived by a per-
ceiver must be granted some reality, for what is totally non–existent such as »the 
son of a barren woman« can never be perceived by anyone at any time (Ranade, 
1970, p. 146). On the other hand, the world is perceived, experienced and, most 
importantly, the world is commonly shared by selves. Therefore, the world can 
never be regarded as a product of the imagination through a cognizing mind.
The second misunderstanding which has to do with the meaninglessness of 
ethics and morality is further amplified by asserting that there cannot be a real 
distinction between good and bad, right and wrong if the world is a mere illusion. 
On the contrary, these distinctions are pivotal for moral discourse. If we suppo-
se this world is illusory, this implies that social and moral obligations are also 
merely the product of illusion. Consequently, no one should walk on the path of 
truthfulness, since truth and falsity are nothing but illusions (Ranade, 1970, p. 
146). The falsity of the world, thus would destroy the foundation of morality. It 
leads to the view that AV cannot uphold ethical discourse within its framework.
These prevailing views rest on a false premise.17 It is not logically possible 
to regard an individual self which is conscious of itself as being illusory. In the 
same manner, the world of our experience in which all our actions take place 
and perceptions are shared cannot be regarded as illusory. The world according 
16 In the present paper ethics and morality are used interchangeably.
17 A proposition such as Brahman is real and the world false (brahma satyam, jagan mithyā jīvo 
brahmaiva napraḥ, CVS, p. 64).
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to AV has Brahman as its substratum.18 Brahman is the ground and the world is 
grounded in it. In order to defend the AV system Radhakrishnan argues:
The inference of the unreality of the world from the sole reality of Brahman is le-
gitimate, if the world is viewed as separate from Brahman. But is there any ground 
for such an assumption? [...] The reality of the Brahman everywhere asserted in the 
Upanishads, instead of implying the unreality of the world, logically involves its rea-
lity (Radhakrishnan, 1914, p. 445).
All misconceptions about AV are based on the initial misreading that Brah-
man and the world are two numerically different entities. In the classic example 
of the rope–snake illusion, the snake is being perceived but not without a ground 
or substratum, i.e., the rope. We consider the snake as illusory, but it is not alto-
gether non–existent, (like the hare’s horn, which has no substratum) (Apte, 1960, 
pp. 398–410). The perception of the snake is made possible by means of an actual 
existent substratum — a rope. So, whenever there is the perception or experience 
of something, the experience is possible only because there is some underlying 
reality. Similarly, the world and all experiences undertaken in the world cannot 
be illusory. Since Brahman is the ground upon which the world of phenomena 
is projected, all other existence depends upon Brahman for its reality and being 
(Swami Madhvananda, 1921, p. 222). Brahman appearing as the world is ana-
logous to the rope mistakenly perceived as a snake. The snake could never be 
perceived if there was no underlying reality of rope and can only last as long as 
the rope is not perceived.
Similarly, the existence of the world cannot be denied. The experience of the 
world stands confirmed. Śaṅkara assigns empirical reality to the world (Apte, 
1960, p. 306). In Śaṅkara’s schema there are three levels of reality: pāramārthika 
(transcendental/absolute), vyāvhārika (empirical) and prātibhāsika (illusory). 
The Brahman is the pāramārthika sattā (absolute reality), the world of space–
time–causality belongs to vyāvhārika, while an erroneous perception of objects 
like silver in the shell, the snake in the rope, are at the prātibhāsika level. Śaṅkara 
admits that the world is as real as anything possibly can be at the empirical level 
of reality (Apte, 1960, pp. 306–307). It is undoubtedly true that the main pre-
supposition — Brahman is real, the world is false and the individual self is none 
other than the universal soul brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā jīvo nāparaḥ (CVS, p. 
64) is found in the writings of Śaṅkara. This assertion indicates that the plurality 
of the world is false or unreal because it disappears at the moment when the 
effect of ignorance disappears. Thus, the world is unreal from the standpoint 
18 Śaṅkara repeatedly asserts that Brahman is the ground (adhiṣṭhāna), Efficient cause (kārana), 
Material cause (upādāna), support (āspada) of the world appearance. All these expressions are 
used to reveal the oneness of the world with Brahman (Brahmaiva idaṃ viśvam). The finite mul-
tiplicity of the world is ontologically non–different from the Absolute. Their finitude and multi-
plicity consists in the names and forms which are being superimposed on the Self–absolute. An 
individual self and its multiple world differ only in name and form from Self and does not have 
its own ontological status. Ontologically the undivided unity of Self remains unimpaired by the 
multiplicity of sublatable names and forms.
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of transcendental reality. The world is regarded as real (empirically) because 
it is being experienced, and notably Brahman is the substratum or ground on 
which this world of plurality appears. Thus, the world is neither absolutely real 
nor absolutely not real, but it is relatively ‘real’. The world is real in relation to 
the Brahman and apart from Brahman the world can have no existence (Swami 
Madhvananda, 1921, pp. 102–104). Moreover, prior to the realization of Brah-
man all the transactions of the phenomenal world are real enough (BSBhS, p. 
57). Again, this remark can be strengthened by Śaṅkara’s writing in the Brahma 
Sūtra Bhāṣya:
It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Bra-
hma as the self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being 
are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time 
being) until waking consciousness returns [...]. Therefore prior to the realization of 
Brahma as the Self of all, all the worldly and religious transactions based on the 
scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e., valid, even as ordinary man, while he is 
asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities, and definitely considers his 
experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived, and has no 
notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception) (Apte, 
1960, pp. 306–307).
From the above statement, it is obvious that AV advocates empirical realism. 
Any experience at the empirical level cannot be rejected out rightly. If a person 
erroneously perceives a pillar before him in the dim light as a man, then his 
experience is considered as being right until and unless it is not sublated by the 
experience of the pillar. It implies that all worldly experiences are phenomenally 
real.19 The world cannot be sheer illusion. Sheer illusion can never be perceived 
or experienced. The reality can thus be viewed from two standpoints or types 
of experience, first from the standpoint of relational experience (yuktidarśana) 
in which one relates oneself to the entities of the world; and secondly from the 
standpoint of the experience of ultimate being (Shrivastava, 1968, pp. 57–80). 
Śaṅkara emphasizes that from the former standpoint (empirical level) reality of 
all our experiences, including the identity of ‘Self’ with the body and creation of 
its co–relate ‘other’ and the behaviors resulting from the creation of these images 
cannot be denied, but at the level of the latter type of experience (transcenden-
tal level or experience of ultimate being, i.e., Brahman), the sense of difference 
between self and other is removed (Apte, 1960, pp. 306–312). Moreover, the 
activities performed with the apprehension of the distinction (resulting in social 
disharmony) between self and other (particularly unethical activities) also fade 
away (Shrivastava, 1968, pp. 105–117).20
19  Empirical actions are real from an empirical point of view but from a paramārthika point of 
view, the empirical world and its activities are false.
20  Since at this level there remains no plurality, the self experiences the oneness of all beings.
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2. The Problem of Enworlded Subjectivity
From the perspective of a Brahman realized self, there is no duality, and hen-
ce there is no distinction between self and other. Furthermore, the question of 
right and wrong actions or making a moral choice does not make sense. In other 
words, at the level of absolute reality (pārmārthika sattā) AV does not need any 
ethics or guiding principles for action, since at this level (transcendental or abso-
lute level) pure consciousness is ultimately undifferentiated, de–individualized 
and absolute. Furthermore, where there is an absence of duality, the question 
of doing good or bad to the other does not make sense. However, at the level of 
phenomenal reality (vyāvhārika sattā), there is duality, difference and the self–
other dichotomy seems so real that we need guiding principles for choosing the 
right action with respect to oneself and the other. Now, given that at the level 
of absolute reality the self–other distinction is not real, AV has to explain how 
absolute, non–dual, unqualified consciousness gets involved in the phenomenal 
world and perceives the self–other dichotomy. This is the basic problem, accor-
ding to Balasubramanian (1992), which the system of AV faces: the problem of 
‘enworlded subjectivity’.21 Balasubramanian defines the problem of Enworlded 
Subjectivity for the Advaita as follows:
There is, on the one hand, the dichotomy between consciousness and the world of objects 
presented to consciousness; there is, on the other hand, involvement of consciousness 
in the objects of the world. How is it possible, Advaita asks, that consciousness which is 
essentially different from everything else presented to it as its object, get itself involved in 
the objects of the world surrounding it, losing its identity in such a way that it is not even 
reckoned as an entity in its own along with other objects?« (Balasubramanian, 1992, p. 77).
Enworlded consciousness and the object presented to consciousness are two 
different entities, but when consciousness becomes engaged in the objects of the 
world and does not realize its essence as real, then the problem of enworlded su-
bjectivity arises. The philosophy of Śaṅkara deals with the problem of enworlded 
subjectivity, i.e., Self being involved in the world falsely identifies itself with the 
world. The dichotomy between consciousness and the world of objects presented 
to consciousness shows that the objects presented to consciousness are different 
from it and therefore are the object of consciousness. On the other hand, cons-
ciousness which reveals the object is only the subject. The object which is uncon-
scious can never be designated as the Self, but, it is natural for the individual self 
to regard objects such as mind, senses and body as conscious. Since, it is the mind 
which thinks, it is the body which feels and acts; the individual under ignorance 
thinks of mind and body as conscious. Superimposition of the mind, senses and 
body on consciousness leads to the false identity of the Self with the objects giving 
rise to day–to–day activities. All our worldly transactions comprising all kinds of 
21 Enworlded subjectivity simply means subject or individual self actively engaged or involved in the 
affairs of the world.
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activities — conative and affective (lokavyavahāra) rest on the discrimination 
between subject and object.
The individual self cannot be owner of anything that is different from it,22 be 
it mind, sense organs, the body or any external object outside one’s mind, sen-
ses and body. (Balasubramanian, 1992). The nature of Self or consciousness is 
such that, being the principle of awareness in human knowledge and experience, 
it remains untouched and unaffected by all that is known or experienced. All 
experienced objects cannot belong to Self or can affect it. This means attributing 
anything to Self is logically impossible, because all that we know, think and speak 
of cannot be about Self. It reveals the fact that the conception of self taken in our 
normal activities is always predicated. Again, the other is always seen along with 
predications (mind, senses and body); while AV establishes that Self (pure cons-
ciousness) is beyond all predications and is to be realized as one and non–plural. 
This realization of Self (Self without predications) leads to the identification of 
one’s self as not being different from another, i.e., self–in–other and other–in–
self (Sarukkai, 1997, p. 1408).
3. The Higher Identity: Ground for Advaita
Predications to Self result in the feeling of distinctiveness and separation from 
other selves. This feeling gives rise to a particular attitude or behavior towards 
others, which is the root of most of our misery and suffering. In AV, metaphysical 
ignorance occupies a significant position. It is only because of ignorance that the 
cycle of birth, death, pain and pleasure is associated with the individual self. The 
individual self without knowing its essential nature gets involved in the affairs of 
the world and performs actions. The results of actions lead to a future life invol-
ving pain and pleasure. Moreover, it is on account of these painful experiences 
in the “life–world” that the self experiences bondage. This bondage generates 
an inner urge to know the Real and attain liberation. AV advocates that in year-
ning for liberation (mumukṣa) from suffering, one realizes that the cause of the 
suffering is ignorance about the real nature of the self. While everything is Self23 
and all the predications to Self rest upon a mistake, then such mistaken thin-
king leads to recognizing the reality of the other as being different from the self. 
There occurs discrimination24 between self and other due to this misconception, 
22 Individual self is different from mind, senses and body because the true nature of the individual 
self is pure consciousness while the mind, senses and body are devoid of consciousness. They 
are sometimes present and sometimes absent (eg in deep sleep), but the Self remains constantly 
present in all stages (of consciousness) (sleep, dream and deep sleep).
23 It means that the all are one, i.e., Self/Brahman but due to limitation the one appears as many. 
Swami Nikhilananda writes in his introduction to the translation of Ātmabodha »it is the asso-
ciation with the upādhis of various material bodies that makes Brahman appear as gods, angels, 
men, animals, birds, trees and stones« (Swami Nikhilananda, 1946, pp. 58–59).
24 Discrimination is the unfair and unequal treatment of a person based on some personal charac-
teristics like gender, race, caste etc. It has created various social evils like the problem of unto-
uchability, apartheid, exploitation of the poor, bribery, corruption etc.
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which leads to consequences which are not good for the individual and society 
as a whole.
One of the causes of social problems is the ego or ahaṃkāra.25 Sibajiban 
Bhattacharya defines the function of the ego as:
i)‘Ego’ the source of ‘I’ consciousness, ii) owner of all mental states and acts of the 
individual...iv) restricts a person and separates him from other persons and the objects 
of the world, v) is the center around which all thoughts and actions revolve, vi) usurps 
all functions of pure consciousness as the foundation of a person, vii) is the principle of 
identity and identifies itself with the mind–body complex.... (Bhattacharya, 1992, pp. 59).
It reveals the fact that the ego is the major vehicle or carrier of all activities. 
The ego expresses itself as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ and the idea of self identity is created. 
This ego is the foundation on which all other identities are framed such as that 
of family, religion, nationality, etc. (Rao, 2012, pp. 202–206). The ego constantly 
strives to be always in the right, always superior, never wrong and never inferior. 
It constantly seeks self–importance, power and superiority over others. The root 
of most conflicts in society is the ego or an image of the self constructed under 
ignorance (Rao, 2012, pp. 201–202).
All activities in the world are associated with self and other, and so the distinc-
tion between them plays an important role.26 However, if the source of the dis-
tinction is not properly understood, this may lead to chaos in society because this 
distinction is the source of further discrimination based on caste, color, creed, 
sex, and religion. This discrimination is an extension of the distinction between 
self and other and most problems such as social discrimination, exploitation and 
political oppression of the people of one group by the people of another group is 
generally fueled by the feeling that they are different, inferior and deserve to be 
ruled and exploited.27 This is not all; namely, most of our present conflicts due to 
economic competition are also rooted in this distinction between self and other. 
Instead of helping the economically weak, there are trade wars going on, which 
have the potential to trigger a full scale armed conflict between nations. It is due 
25 Ego is the aspect of mind that expresses individuality. It is known in Sanskrit as the ahaṃkāra 
aham meaning ‘I’ and kāra meaning ‘maker’. Therefore, it is the composer of individuality and 
distinguishes itself from other ‘I’s’ (ego’s). It is the ego that gives the sense of ‘I’ or mine. In every 
action one is conscious of oneself as ‘I am the doer.’ The ego occurs due to the association of the 
Self with the limiting adjuncts (mind, senses and body). Ego is the covering over the Self.
26 AV advocates non–duality or non–difference. Duality according to AV is a false appearance, 
but it is a well known fact that ethics is possible only if there is a duality between self and other. 
For instance, charity is practiced not towards oneself but towards the other. So, if duality is to 
be regarded as false, then how can AV hold ethics within its metaphysical framework? There is 
no doubt that every action presupposes a duality between one self and other. AV proposes three 
levels of reality and ascribe empirical level to the world. At the empirical level world is not false. 
At this level, it is the difference between one self and other that makes possible all worldly affairs 
(lokavyavahāra). Therefore it is evident that ethics is possible in the system of AV.
27 We have numerous examples of this in human history. The Nazi genocide of the Jews is well 
documented and recent examples include conflict in the Middle East among various factions 
divided on religious grounds; also, there are violent clashes between Burmese Buddhists and the 
Rohingya Muslims.
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to this distinction between self and other and hatred for the other that today we 
have economies based on violent conflicts which justifies the production of guns, 
tanks, missiles and even nuclear weapons, which can annihilate the population of 
the entire earth many times.
Hence, it is crucial to note that AV goes beyond this distinction by teaching 
the oneness of all selves. The oneness of all implies absence of the ‘other.’ The 
absence of the other does not indicate the elimination of the other, but rather 
an absence of the feeling of distinction between one and the other. Thus, once 
the feeling of distinction (discrimination based on this distinction) between self 
and other is removed, the treatment of the ‘other’ in an undesirable way is also 
dispensed with. When we consider others as being different from ourselves, we 
are not bothered about the harm caused to the other by our actions, but on the 
other hand, if we have some concern for the other, we cannot harm the other. 
This is because we now look upon the other person as no longer being the ‘other’. 
Rather, we are treating the other as an extension of ourselves (Rao, 2012, pp. 
202–206). It is natural for us to desire to preserve our own identity and existence. 
However, in the course of our existence one may behave and act inappropriately 
for reasons of self— subsistence. This causes harm to the other many a time. In 
sharp contrast, once the self has recognized its unity and non–difference with the 
other, it functions in an amicable fashion. This sense of ‘oneness of all’ brings 
transformation in the attitude of the individual self, which further leads towards 
an ideal, peaceful and just society.
4. The Schema of Moral Discourse
Morality, in general, is based upon a differentiating28 consciousness — a con-
sciousness that necessarily grasps itself through the distinction between ‘self’ and 
‘other’. The argument for sustaining such a position is that every action is perfor-
med upon someone else, and based upon the same argument the idea of recipro-
city is constructed and nurtured. This position confirms the necessity of the other 
for morality (Rao, 2012, p. 206). The ordinary understanding of karma theory is 
also justified on the same grounds. Presuming the dichotomy between self and 
other which is constructed upon apparent differences between the enworlded 
subjects, moral thinkers have built numerous theoretical models for addressing 
basic questions on how one should behave towards the other. The assumption 
of any kind of ‘I’ and the idea of self based upon that will, by default, demands 
or produces a ‘you’ — the other. Otherness is an inevitable spin–off of identity. 
28 Consciousness which differentiates itself from the other’s consciousness is the differentiating 
consciousness. In morality, differentiating consciousness occupies a significant position. The 
ethical questions arise only for the individual consciousness (which differentiates itself from 
another individual consciousness) and not for pure consciousness which is simple and without 
any subject–object distinction. Similarly, all ethics or morality is based upon differentiating con-
sciousness. AV must maintain the reality of differentiating consciousness at an empirical level 
but this differentiating consciousness is not to be taken (in AV) as the discriminative force which 
leads to turmoil in society.
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Most of the moral discourse is an arduous attempt to develop a roadmap for 
achieving harmonious co–existence between the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’
AV does not develop any such theory; rather, it addresses a fundamental pro-
blem of the aforesaid dichotomy and systematically argues that the apparent or 
empirical phenomenon of using ‘self’ and ‘other’ for referring to distinct beings 
involves a cognitive error. Also, it further proceeds to correct the error by expla-
ining the superimposition, which is not merely an exercise in the epistemologi-
cal or metaphysical sense, but it carves out a ground for the essential oneness 
of beings, which brings about a significant transformation of attitude. Śaṅkara 
teaches the absolute oneness of all beings (Swami Madhvananda, 1921, pp. 102–
103, 112–114). Recognition and realization of absolute oneness bring about a 
compassionate attitude, which impregnates the self in sharing suffering and joy, 
i.e., a spontaneous attempt to remove the other’s suffering and to rejoice in their 
happiness (Alladi Mahadeva Sastry, 1977, pp. 311–312). An enlightened being — 
jīvanmukta, a person liberated while alive has the experience of oneness of the 
Self and the absolute. He has become a boundless ocean of love and compassion. 
Prior to the realization of the individual self as the Self, he lives and acts as an 
isolated agent. All his actions are directed towards self–interest, but after the rise 
of knowledge of Self, he lives and acts in oneness with Self. He feels the interest 
of all living beings as his own and in this sense he may be said to enter into all 
things as »the wise who have control over their passions, find the all–pervading 
everywhere and enter into all things« (Datta, 1888, 532).29 Deutsch comments:
The quality then that ought to inform human action is non–egoism, which, positively 
expressed, is what the Advaitin understands to be ‘love’.30 One must interrelate with 
‘others’, one must conduct oneself, with the knowledge that the other is non— diffe-
rent from oneself. Love, the meeting of another in the depth of being, must be groun-
ded in knowledge, and when it is so grounded, it expresses itself in every action that 
one performs (cf. Robbiano, 2016, pp. 146–147).
It is the knowledge of non–difference that is the motivating force behind the 
performance of actions directed towards the welfare of all. In ethical activities or 
moral actions, the individual is enjoined to cultivate the spirit of non–difference 
and this spirit can be explored in the teachings of Śaṅkara. In enlightenment — 
the realization of unity of Brahman in all things — the sense of boundless equ-
ality becomes manifested. As Swami Nikhilananda holds, »Seeing all beings in 
himself and himself in all beings, the sage treats others as if they were their own 
self« (Swami Nikhilananda, 1948, p. 28).31
29 In this work, Datta (1888) has cited this quotation but does not provide any reference of such a 
citation, since the quote seems to be from an ancient text.
30 Love is the expression of affection towards someone. Love in this context springs from the union 
of one’s self and an other when the distinction between my interest and the other’s interest is 
overcome. Love emerges at the moment when the connection between ‘I’ and ‘you’ is stronger 
than the apparent separation.
31 Similarly, Śaṅkarācārya holds that »that which is superimposed upon something else is observed 
by the wise to be identical with substratum as in the case of a rope appearing as a snake — the 
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One who has understood and experienced the higher identity — the oneness 
of all beings — is beyond the distinction of good and evil and thus free from cri-
me. This simply means that the realized self has surpassed the realm of duality 
and has a new perception of life and the world. With this, the moral distincti-
on between good and evil is no more significant or relevant to the enlightened. 
Thus, he develops a new vision of integrity with all beings and this vision is full 
of a compassionate attitude towards all selves. This forms a new moral perspec-
tive. The concept of good and evil presupposes self — good actions are directed 
towards the welfare of the self, and evil actions interfere with the well–being of 
others. The essence of evil actions lies in the postulation of the individual self, 
but when the error of the postulation is removed then the sense of non–differen-
ce among all individual selves supervenes (Radhakrishnan, 1959, pp. 102–105). 
Identification of Self with the other (oneness of all creatures) by the enlightened 
mind precludes the possibility of inappropriate actions towards the other. Thus, 
the sense of oneness in AV becomes the basis of morality.
Certainly, the distinction of good and evil forms the basis for ethical discourse, 
but there is a unique and exclusive schema of ethical discourse in AV which lies, 
not in the difference but in the identity of all selves. The sense of oneness is re-
vealed in one of the great statements (mahāvākya)32 asserted in the Upaniṣhads, 
tat tvam asi (that thou art).33 The intention of the statement is to indicate that 
the individual self ‘thou’ limited by adjuncts is no other than the absolute, which 
is referred to as ‘that.’ Identity is obtained by discovering the integral meaning 
of apparently incompatible and contradictory terms34 ‘that’ and ‘thou’ and the-
reby arriving at their common ground, i.e., consciousness. If the individual self 
is regarded as ‘thou’ and the Brahman is taken as ‘that’, then it would be diffi-
apparent difference depends solely on delusion« (Swami Madhvananda, 1921, p. 178). Wise is the 
person who has realized the Self. The wise one understands that the difference in empirical existen-
ce is mere appearance. All existents have one substratum, and there is non–difference in reality.
32 There are four mahavākyas cited in four Upaniṣhads. The aim of these mahavākya is to express 
the identity between ātman and Brahman. These are: 1) Prajñānam Brahma — Brahman is supre-
me knowledge. It is asserted in Aitareya Upaniṣhad. 2) Tat tvam asi — you are that, soul/ātman in 
the individual self is Brahman. It is found in Chāndogya Upaniṣhad. 3) Ayam ātma Brahma — Self 
(ātman) is Brahman. It is found in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣhad. 4) Aham Brahmāsmi — “I” (Self) am 
Brahman. This statement is found in Bṛhadārayaṇka Upaniṣhad.
33 That thou art is a mahāvākya (great statement) used in the sixth chapter of Chāndogya Upāniṣhad; 
Uddālaka teaches his son Śvetaketu about the nature of Self. The statement implies the non–
difference between the essential nature of soul which is consciousness and the essential nature 
of Brahman which, too, is consciousness. The aim of this statement is to dispel the ignorance 
surrounding Self, as Self is veiled (āvaraṇaśakti) by the limiting adjuncts of the not–self, i.e., the 
mind, senses and body. This composite of relativities is falsely regarded as “myself”; then is impo-
sed on Self such that the unique and universal subject is falsely regarded as having the objective 
characteristics of a particular individual. The mahāvākya affirming the true nature of the self, by 
dispelling this superimposition of the differentiation born of ignorance, awakens the jīva to his 
true identity as Self being Brahman. Ᾱtman is unborn uncreated, undying and eternal: it is pure, 
objectless consciousness not to be identified with the empirical ego.
34 They are contradictory in the sense that ‘thou’ is the individual selves with limitation while ‘that’ 
is the infinite, all pervading consciousness.
S. Raina, The ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’... Obnovljeni život, 2018, 73(4), 517–535
532
cult to maintain their identity since their nature is different. However, there is 
‘secondary sense’ in the sentence, namely, ‘that’ and ‘thou’ which reveals the 
integral meaning of the terms. Secondary sense discloses that if ‘thou’ refers to 
pure consciousness underlying the individual and that ‘that’ denotes pure con-
sciousness which is the essential nature of Brahman, then the identity between 
them emerges. The pure identity of ‘that’ and ‘thou’ is the essential nature of all 
existent beings in the world.35 This identity of all individuals with the one Brah-
man is directed towards the unity of all selves, which forms the basis of ethics or 
morality. Śaṅkara cites »The Self abiding in all beings and all beings (abiding) in 
the Self sees he, whose self has been made steadfast by yoga,36 who everywhere 
sees the same« (Alladi Mahadeva Sastry, 1977, p. 198).
Furthermore, in his commentary on Bhagavadgītā, Śaṅkara cites the warri-
or Krishna: »working for the welfare of others itself is non–violence (ahiṁsā)« 
(Alladi Mahadeva Sastry, 1977, p. 225). Various virtues37 are emphasized which 
are to be cultivated: an individual self who is desirous of liberation must cul-
tivate virtues like temperance (self–control), prudence, courage etc. The prac-
tice of various good actions such as the study of scriptures, penance, sincerity, 
non–injury, truthfulness, absence of anger, self–abnegation, peace, absence of 
jealousy, kindness, softness, forgiveness, cleanliness of body and mind, celibacy, 
renunciation of all possessions, withdrawal of senses from their objects, austeri-
ties, softness, modesty, etc. leads to the cultivation of virtues (Dasgupta, 1994, p. 
115). These virtues evoke a transformation in the behavior of the seeker leading 
to the highest good (liberation) and also prove instrumental in the creation of a 
conflict–free society.38
If one understands the essential unity of all beings (even if one does not re-
alize the jīva–Brahman identity in a transcendental sense), one’s attitude towar-
ds others and all actions upon others will incur significant transformation. A 
supporter of AV might argue that, despite refraining from theorizing about mo-
rality, the system provides a substantial foundation for moral living in which any 
35 Once the identity is established, the world and its objects exist but without a trace of avidyā. The 
world is not dissolved, only the avidyā is removed. Moreover, avidyā is not the basis of all existent 
entities in the world. Avidyā is the basis of all distinctions only. When avidyā is removed, all attri-
butes of Self, which is the cause of distinction and discrimination, are removed.
36 Yoga is a discipline for developing one’s inherent power in a balanced manner. It is a means of 
attaining Self–realization. Simply stated, yoga is defined as a means of uniting the individual soul 
with the Universal soul (Brahman).
37 Virtue is a quality which is considered morally good or desirable in a person, for instance patien-
ce, courage etc.
38 It is possible to have a conflict–free society if every individual in society understands and per-
forms his duty well, for then society can be a beautiful place to live in. No doubt society has always 
been in conflict. Although people understand the importance of a peaceful world, manmade 
disasters are far worse than any natural catastrophe. Disagreements, differences over ideologies, 
beliefs, etc. are bound to cause conflict, but there is a fragile aspect to man also. As the proverb 
says, ‘man is harder than a rock but also more fragile than an egg’. This fragile aspect of man is 
to be explored, and it can be explored within the message of AV. The teaching of non–difference 
between one individual self and the other will scatter the seed of brotherhood and love among 
beings. This can be a boon to society.
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normative (deontological, virtue ethical or consequentialist) concerns are not the 
primary issues, but the consciousness that works behind all knowing and doing is 
what matters. In brief, the norms of action or its consequence, are of secondary 
importance; and the attitudinal transformation before all actions is of primary 
importance. 
The AV’s position can also be seen in view of the fact that despite knowledge 
of good and evil, right and wrong, human beings are not prompted to genuinely 
engage in doing what is right and refraining from doing what is wrong. The pro-
per inducement to virtuous living demands or presupposes a consciousness or 
a preceding cognition, which in the case of AV is represented by the ‘essential 
unity of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Without this consciousness as a necessary condition of 
virtuous living, mere knowledge of good and evil does not prompt human beings 
to lead a morally commendable life. In ordinary experience, the said consciou-
sness is instantiated by our expressions of empathy, care, cooperation, love, etc. 
When one portrays these traits and experiences these mental states, essential 
human unity with all beings is experienced in fact.
Conclusion
Based upon the above discussion, it follows that the empirical identity of ego 
in reference to the ‘enworlded subjectivity’ is based upon an error. AV argues 
for a metaphysical basis of oneness — a superseding identity of the Self that 
absorbs all possible otherness. This is a kind of oneness, the absence of which 
functions as the basis of all discrimination of self and other, and the realization 
of which brings about an attitudinal transformation. Accordingly, a new kind of 
moral discourse becomes possible, which calls for attitudinal transformation and 
the cultivation of virtues as the foundation for moral living.39 In a conventional 
treatment of morality, the ‘other’ remains distant and unrelated to the self and 
hence offers no substantial reason as to why one should strive for virtues like 
empathy, compassion, and love for all beings.
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‘Ja’ i ‘ti’ u Advaita Vedanti: moralna interpretacija
Simran Raina*
Sažetak
Članak istražuje metafizičke i etičke pristupe koji su inherentni slici ‘ja’ i ‘ti’ u Ad-
vaita Vedanti (AV). AV proučava narav pojmovne podjele između ‘ja’ (asmad) i 
‘ti’ (yusmad). Ukazuje na superimpoziciju koja stoji iza svakodnevnih izričaja za te 
pojmove — adhyasa kao metafizička preteča — koja generira kognitivnu pogrešku u 
svim takvim izričajima u kojima se koriste osobne zamjenice ‘ja’ sa superimpozici-
jom atributa poput ‘debeo’, ‘visok’ itd. Stav je AV da do distinkcije između ‘ja’ i 
‘ti’ dolazi zbog kognitivne pogreške uzrokovane superimpozicijom. Drugim riječima, 
uočavati razlike u realnom svijetu predstavlja neznanje (avidya). Nadalje, ako se 
to neznanje nadomjesti stvarnim znanjem, tj. spoznajom realnosti kao Advaita, tj. 
ne–dualnosti, uočit ćemo razvoj drukčije vrste spoznanja koje otkrivaju inherent-
no jedinstvo između ‘ja’ i ‘ti’. Spoznaja o inherentnom jedinstvu generira drukčiji 
stav, koji čini da iščezavaju društveni problemi kao što su socio–politička neravno-
pravnost, mržnja, nasilje itd., koji se temelje na distinkciji između ‘ja’ i ‘ti’. Kao 
svaka spoznaja, spoznaja o ostvarenju inherentne ne–dualnosti ili advaita donosi 
promjenu stava prema stvarnosti. U tom slučaju, stav necijenjenja distinkcije između 
‘ja’ i ‘ti’ mijenja se u prepoznavanje ne–dualnosti u svim osobama.
Međutim, s obzirom na to da AV zagovara ne–dualnost, ona u načelu ne može 
govoriti o moralu ili etici na bitan način, jer etika pretpostavlja dualnost između 
‘ja’ i ‘ti’. Stoga postoji izazov da se pokaže da je, prema AV, ne–dualnost ‘ja’ i 
‘ti’ izvor morala. Osim toga, predlaže se etika aktivne ljubavi, a ona je sukladna s 
metafizičkim obvezama u AV. Etika aktivne ljubavi razvija se kad se osoba odrekne 
ideje o razlikama te se poistovjećuje s drugima. Dobro je poznata činjenica da je 
korijen većine društvenih zala diskriminacija između ‘ja’ i ‘ti’. Nadalje, upravo ego 
(ja) stvara jaz između jednog čovjeka i drugoga, što ima za posljedicu da društvo 
pati od raznih problema, poput nasilja, mržnje, socijalne diskriminacije, korupcije 
itd. Pojam jednosti svih bića kojega zagovara AV stvara duh ljubavi i sklada među 
pojedinim egima, a ta je ljubav kamen temeljac etike ili morala. S obzirom na izlag-
anja u AV o tom problemu, moralna interpretacija inherentnog jedinstva između ‘ja’ 
i ‘ti’ također je naznačena.
Cilj je članka dvostruk: 1. ispitati i izložiti metafizički položaj AV s obzirom na dis-
tinkciju između ‘ja’ i ‘ti’; 2. odgovoriti na problem mogućnosti moralnih ili etičkih 
čina unutar metafizike AV novom vrstom morala, koji se temelji na poistovjećivanju 
svojega ‘ja’ i ‘ti’ drugoga. Drugim riječima, etikom koja se temelji na i koja je kom-
patiblina s Advaita metafizikom.
Ključne riječi: Advaita, superimpozicija, empirijska subjektivnost, Ja, individu-
alno ja, identitet, razlike, moral
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